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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
6th Cir.  
 
Encana Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Zaremba Family Farms, Inc., 16-2065/17-
1429, 2018 WL 2446698 (6th Cir. May 31, 2018). 
 
Oil Operator sued Mineral Owner, seeking the return of $1.8 million of the 
$2 million that had been exchanged upon the agreement between the parties 
to negotiate a binding lease agreement. Because the intended agreement 
between Oil Operator and Mineral Owner failed to come to fruition, Oil 
Operator requested the $1.8 million and subsequently sued Mineral Owner 
for breach of contract. Contrary to the unquestioned prior agreement 
between the parties, an employee of Oil Operator mistakenly told Mineral 
Owner that it could keep the entirety of the $2 million. After this dispute 
arose, Oil Operator was accused of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act and 
the Michigan Antirust Act by working with other operators to avoid bidding 
wars over lease prices in Michigan. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that Mineral Owner failed to prove the antirust conspiracy and 
ordered the return of the $1.8 million. Despite Oil Operator employee’s 
mistaken communication, the appellate court held that the communication 
did not rise to the level of a contract waiver since, under Michigan law, a 
waiver requires consideration.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
D. New Mexico 
 
Cibola Energy Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, No. 12-cv-1099 MCA/LFG, 
2018 WL 2337137 (D.N.M. May 23, 2018). 
 
Operator appealed Bureau’s decision, alleging that Bureau acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously when it ordered Operator to conduct production tests on a 
well after Operator applied for the well to be assigned “temporarily 
abandoned” status. The well was completed in 1990 and never produced. It 
was last tested for production in 1990, and the test indicated that production 
was “marginal.” In 2011, Operator applied for a “temporarily abandoned” 
status to the well in order to maintain the lease on the well’s land. Bureau 
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determined that even if a well is not producing, it must be capable of 
producing in paying qualities to avoid termination of the lease. The phrase 
“capable of production” means a well that is actually in a condition to 
produce at the particular time in question. Operator sought to rely on the 
1990 test to prove this “capable of production” status, but Bureau ordered 
new testing to determine whether there were unknown changed conditions 
in order to decide whether to extend the leases. The district court held that 
this new data was necessary to determine the current status of the well. 
Therefore, it was not arbitrary or capricious to order new production tests, 
and the court upheld Bureau’s decision. 
 
Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, No. CIV–15–0209 
JB/SCY, 2018 WL 1940992 (D.N.M. Apr. 23, 2018). 
 
Environmental Organization filed suit against Government Entities for 
violating the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by failing to 
consult with particular affected parties before approving drilling permits for 
Third Party Drilling Company. After the trial court denied Environmental 
Organization’s motion for preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of 
Government Entities’ authorization of drilling permits, and the subsequent 
affirmation by an appellate judge, Environmental Organization filed for a 
review on the merits and a permanent injunction. The United States District 
Court for the District of New Mexico found that: (1) Environmental 
Organization’s allegations of an increased environmental risk and aesthetic 
injury were concrete enough injuries to constitute standing and were fairly 
traceable to Government Entities’ alleged failure to adhere to the NEPA; 
(2) Government Entities’ analysis of the potential impacts of the drilling 
was proper and complied with the NEPA; (3) Government Entities 
complied with the NEPA’s requirement for public involvement by placing 
information about the proposed wells on its website, along with extending 
invitations to the public to meetings regarding the wells; (4) Government 
Entities’ delay in furnishing its environmental assessments did not violate 
the NEPA because the assessments were available “promptly upon 
request”; (5) the location and potential impacts of the drilling did not 
require Government Entities to perform any further notification or 
consultation, because it would not adversely impact the groups in question; 
and (6) even if the alleged harm did occur, a preliminary injunction would 
be the improper remedy because “the presumption favors vacatur and, in 
this case, vacatur more properly addresses the harm.” For those reasons, the 
court denied Environmental Organization’s request for review and 
injunction and dismissed the claims with prejudice.  
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This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher 
court as of publication. 
 
N.D. Ohio 
 
Kerns v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, No. 5:18 CV 389, 2018 WL 2952662 
(N.D. Ohio June 13, 2018). 
 
Property Owners filed suit against Operator and Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources (“ODNR”) for due process violations regarding the 
taking of Property Owners’ mineral interests after Operator commenced 
horizontal drilling, which obtained oil and gas from underneath Property 
Owners’ land. The district court found that: (1) regardless of whether 
Property Owners actually held the mineral interests in question, they had 
standing to bring suit because their allegations encompassed claims that 
Operator’s actions also interfered with the use of the surface land; (2) 
because Operator would not have been subject to the state’s required 
mandamus action for such a complaint, Property Owners’ failure to utilize 
that avenue for compensation did not prevent this case from being ripe for 
review; (3) because Property Owners could not adequately allege that 
Operator was acting under the color of state law in a fashion that made it a 
state actor, their claims for violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments should be dismissed; (4) because Property Owners’ suit 
alleged an ongoing violation of federal law and also sought prospective 
relief, ODNR was not immune from suit via its status as a state actor; and 
(5) the Ohio law authorizing the taking in question was not unconstitutional 
because the state has a right to reduce waste when it comes to oil and gas. 
For those reasons, the court found that Property Owners failed to state a 
claim under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, and accordingly granted 
Operator and ODNR’s Motions to Dismiss. 
 
N.D. West Virginia 
 
Packard v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:18CV04, 2018 WL 2348398 (N.D. 
W.Va. May 23, 2018). 
 
Lessors sued Lessee claiming that their oil and gas leases did not contain 
pooling authorization, and, despite the lack of authorization, Lessee drilled 
producing horizontal wells crossing through the Lessor’s three tracts of land 
and pooled their minerals. Lessors claimed trespass, breach of contract, and 
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breach of the implied duty to protect against drainage. The district court 
determined that Lessors trespass claim was barred by West Virginia’s gist 
of the action doctrine, which prevents the presentation of a contract issue as 
a tort action. Because Lessors did not claim that Lessee could not enter the 
property to drill, just that they could not pool, trespass was not appropriate. 
Next, the court addressed the breach of contract claim and refused to 
dismiss Lessor’s claim, finding that the leases did not contain the express 
right to pool and that the law did not yet recognize an implied right to pool 
as Lessee argued. Lastly, the court addressed the implied covenant to 
protect against drainage and found that Lessors claims were without merit 
because they were not alleging that Lessee was draining neighboring 
property.. 
 
Bounty Minerals, LLC v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:17cv219, 2018 WL 
2749598 (N.D.W. Va. June 7, 2018). 
 
Lessor claimed that the oil and gas lease (“Lease”) with Lessee was 
terminated for lack of production. Lessor’s complaint alleged lease 
termination for lack of production, slander of title, breach of the implied 
covenant to further explore, and breach of the implied covenant to further 
develop. Lessee filed a motion to dismiss the claims by Lessor. The district 
court found that: (1) because the Lease contained a flat rate or shut-in 
royalty provision, under West Virginia law, whether or not the well was 
producing was irrelevant, and Lessor’s request for Lease termination and 
ejectment was denied; (2) regarding slander of title, because the Lease had 
not been terminated, Lessee was not falsely claiming an interest on the 
property, and accordingly, there was no slander of title; (3) in addressing 
Lessor’s claim of failure by the Lessee to explore further, the court declined 
to recognize the implied covenant, as no West Virginia court had done so 
previously; and (4) Lessee had breached the covenant to develop even 
though the lease was a flat-rate lease.  
 
Upstream – State  
 
Louisiana  
 
Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Res., Inc., 2017-997 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
5/23/18); No. 17-997, 2018 WL 2326189. 
 
Assignor appealed lower court’s award of legal interest on awarded 
damages granted from the date of judicial demand to Lessors for Assignor’s 
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breach of its duty to operate as a reasonably prudent operator by destroying 
and preventing access to a gas reservoir. Prior to the lower court’s ruling, 
Lessors had settled with Assignee for the breach of duty. Assignor claimed 
that the lower court erred in finding them singularly liable since Lessors 
lost revenue due to Assignees’ operations. Additionally, Assignor felt that 
the lower court erred in calculating their share of the damages, as they 
claimed Lessors released Assignor from liability by settling damages with 
Assignees. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana agreed with the lower court 
because the covenant to operate as a reasonably prudent operator is implied 
in the lease, and therefore, Assignees and Assignors have equal portions of 
liability. Additionally, Lessors claimed that the interest should have been 
granted from the date of the breach rather than the date of the judgment. 
Here, the court agreed and amended the lower court’s judgment to include 
interest from the date of the judgment. 
 
Ohio 
 
Mid-Ohio Coal Co. v. Brown, No. 17 CA 21, 2018 WL 2254673, 2018-
Ohio-1934. 
 
This case involves a dispute as to the proper ownership of a mineral estate. 
Party-1 contended that Party-2 only owned the rights to subsurface coal, 
while Party-2 claimed they owned the entire subsurface mineral estate 
without limitation. The trial court found that Party-2 owned the entire 
subsurface estate. Upon review, the Court of Appeals of Ohio agreed with 
the lower court and held that the language of the deed granted the entire 
subsurface mineral estate, not just the rights to coal.  
 
Texas 
 
Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.–USA v. Adams, No. 16–0505, 2018 WL 
2449313 (Tex. June 1, 2018).  
   
Operator-1 sued Operator-2, seeking damages resulting from the alleged 
breach of an oil and gas lease stemming from Lessee’s drilling of an offset 
well based on the drilling of a mineral-producing well on adjacent land. 
Operator-2 posited that the lease did not impose a requirement related to 
distance and argued that, when the lease was contemplated, horizontal shale 
wells were the focus and that minimal drainage existed in the shale 
formation proximate to the well’s location. The Texas Supreme Court, in 
reversing the lower court’s ruling in favor of Operator-1, held that the 
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relevant locations in horizontal drilling are the perforated and fractured 
regions of the horizontal wellbore. Additionally, the court held that the oil 
and gas lease between Operator-1 and Operator-2 plainly detailed the 
specific implications once the offset provision was triggered. Significantly, 
the ruling reaffirms the standard instituted by courts in enforcing only what 
is expressly defined in an oil lease regarding the contractual responsibilities 
of both parties.  
 
Neuhoff v. Piranha Partners, No. 07–16–00136–CV, 2018 WL 2223132 
(Tex. App. May 15, 2018). 
 
Assignor and Assignee disputed what property was actually conveyed in 
Assignment of a properly recorded oil and gas lease. Assignor claimed that 
Assignment only assigned their overriding royalty interest in a specific well 
on their section of land to Assignee. Conversely, Assignee claimed that 
what was assigned was actually an overriding royalty interest over 
Assignor’s entire section. The trial court determined, through the records 
and evidence, that the assignment covered the entire section not just a 
specific well. In analyzing the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals 
of Texas reviewed the assignments using standard principals of contract 
construction. After analysis the appellate court found that the assignment 
only meant to grant an interest in a quarter of the section to Assignee, not 
the entire section or just the specific well. 
 
TRO–X, L.P. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., No. 16–0412, 2018 WL 
2372805 (Tex. May 25, 2018). 
 
Assignor filed suit for breach of contract and trespass to try title, claiming 
that back-in interest on assigned leases to Assignee were not paid. 
However, the leases that were originally assigned were terminated by 
Lessors due to a provision in the lease that required an offset well be drilled 
if a well which was drilled within a certain distance from the boundary of 
the leased property was produced in paying quantities. Assignee admittedly 
failed to meet the provision of the assigned lease and the lease was 
therefore terminated. Assignee then negotiated a new lease with Lessors on 
the same property as the original and terminated leases. Assignee claimed 
that the originally assigned leases were top leases and subject to the back-in 
interest. The trial court agreed with Assignor, but the appellate court 
reversed. Assignee then appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas. Upon 
review, the Court set out to determine whether the second leases were 
intended to be top leases. Only then could Assignors’ back-in interest still 
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be valid. In analyzing top leases and intent, the Court noted that when a 
new lease is executed on an existing lease by the same parties, the existing 
lease is terminated, unless intent is expressly shown otherwise. Therefore, 
the Court found that there was no indication that Lessors and Assignee 
meant for the original leases to survive after the execution of the second 
leases. As such, the original leases were terminated along with Assignor’s 
back-in interest. 
 
U.S. KingKing, LLC v. Precision Energy Servs., Inc., No. 01–17–00215–
CV, 2018 WL 2638648 (Tex. App. June 5, 2018). 
 
Supplier entered into an agreement with Well Operator to supply oilfield 
goods and services. When Well operator failed to pay invoices for labor and 
materials used to drill an oil well, Supplier brought suit against Well 
Operator for breach of contract, fraud, declaratory relief, and foreclosure of 
a mineral lien. Well Operator attempted to pierce the corporate veil and 
hold Supplier’s Parent Company liable for Supplier’s obligations under an 
alter-ego theory. The district court found Parent Company jointly liable for 
the unpaid invoices. Well Operator appealed. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals of Texas found that Supplier failed to establish, as a matter of law, 
that either Well Operator or Parent Company acted with the intent to 
deceive, nor did Supplier conclusively establish that the use of limited 
liability was illegitimate or that Parent Company was attempting to use the 
corporate structure to shield abuses like fraud. As a result, the appellate 
court concluded that Parent Company was not an alter-ego of Well 
Operator and, thus, could not be found jointly liable for the actions of Well 
Operator. 
 
Utah 
 
J.P. Furlong Co. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2018 UT 22, No. 201550620, 
2018 WL 2710963. 
 
Non-Operator challenged an order from Board of Oil, Gas & Mining 
(“Board”) in which it imposed a joint operating agreement (“JOA”) with 
Operator who was operating the drilling unit in which Non-Operator’s lease 
was included. Non-Operator claimed that the JOA was imposed upon it 
without any modification to the Operator-proposed agreement. Non-
Operator felt that there was insufficient evidence to support Board’s 
decision to support the imposition of the JOA. Non-Operator claimed that 
Board did not give proper reasoning for the failure to adopt their proposed 
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changed to the JOA. However, the Supreme Court of Utah ultimately found 
that the adoption of the JOA without any of the Non-Operator proposed 
changes was appropriate because the JOA was based on the model supplied 
by the American Association of Professional Landmen (“AAPL”) form, and 
industry standard was to adopt it without significant modification, just as 
Board had imposed. The court held that there was nothing in the law that 
required Board to balance the interests of the parties, to which a JOA was 
being imposed, in the agreement. 
Midstream – Federal 
 
2d Cir. 
 
Harry v. Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc., 889 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 
Natural gas Investors (“Investors”) brought suit against traders of natural 
gas (“Traders”) claiming monopolization and manipulation of natural gas 
trading in violation of Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) and antitrust 
laws. At trial, Traders motioned for dismissal claiming lack of standing and 
failure to state a claim because Investors failed to allege possibility of 
injury due to the fact that their own derivatives were not indexed under the 
markets. The lower court found that there was no harm or intent, and 
Investors thus failed to state a claim. Investors appealed. On appeal, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that while Investors had Article III 
standing, they failed to state a claim under the CEA or antitrust laws 
because it was not plausible on the record that they were injured by the 
manipulations of Traders. Therefore, the court modified the order and 
judgment to remove the dismissal for lack of standing and affirmed the 
dismissal for failure to state a claim. 
 
D.C. Cir.  
 
City of Clarksville, Tennessee v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 888 
F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 
City is a municipality that operates natural gas services in Tennessee and 
Kentucky, which filed an application with Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) to determine its service area in 2013. Upon 
inspection, FERC discovered that City delivered natural gas through a 
pipeline to a city in Kentucky (“Alternate City”). Though FERC determined 
that City’s provision of natural gas to Alternate City was permissible under 
a previous certificate, it informed City that further transport across state 
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lines would require an entirely different certificate. City claimed that it did 
not require this certification due to its classification of municipality as 
defined by the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) and that FERC, therefore, did not 
have jurisdiction over City. FERC disputed this claim, although it agreed to 
issue City a special certificate to provide Alternate City with natural gas 
due to the long-time arrangement and Alternate City’s reliance on it. City 
appealed FERC’s determination that it maintained jurisdiction over City 
and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that City indeed had standing 
to challenge FERC’s orders, and further, that FERC lacked authority under 
the NGA to regulate a municipality’s natural gas sales. 
 
Midstream – State 
 
Texas 
 
Morello v. Seaway Crude Pipeline Co., No. 01–16–00765–CV, 2018 WL 
2305541 (Tex. App. May 22, 2018). 
 
Property Owner filed suit against Pipeline Company to object to Pipeline 
Company’s planned pipeline through property he owned. The trial court 
found in favor of Pipeline Company, finding that it could condemn 
easements across the land so long as it made appropriate payments to 
Property Owner for market value of the land. Property Owner appealed, 
alleging the trial court erred in finding for Pipeline Company after it failed 
to show a necessity for the taking and that he had presented sufficient 
evidence to survive the summary judgment stage. The Court of Appeals of 
Texas held that: (1) no evidence was provided to support Property Owner’s 
affirmative defenses; (2) Pipeline Company had expressed a sufficient 
necessity for the takings, espousing on multiple occasions that the 
purported path was necessary for efficiency and public convenience; and 
(3) no evidence existed that Pipeline Company acted arbitrarily or abused 
its discretion in plotting its pipeline’s path—neither in violation of existing 
case law, nor via its failure to supervise its agents’ decisions, nor via its 
refusal to consider Property Owner’s requests to alter the path. The court 
also held that Pipeline Company’s amendment to its petition, agreeing to 
pay a portion of the costs which Property Owner sought to recover, did not 
act as an abandonment equivalent to dismissal of its condemnation claim. 
Finally, the court held that the trial court did not err in excluding Property 
Owner’s expert witnesses because their testimony would not have mended 
the issues with Property Owner’s positions that eventually led to the 
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summary judgment against him. For those reasons, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s judgment.   
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
9th Cir.  
 
United States v. U.S. Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 893 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 
Farmers brought suit claiming injury to their water rights as a result of a 
voluntary water rights leasing program managed by National Fish and 
Wildlife Foundation (“NFWF”), which was created to convey water from a 
river downstream to a lake. NFWF applied with Nevada State Engineer 
(“Engineer”) for two change applications to its program: (1) a request 
changing the place of use to a broader area; and (2) changing the purpose of 
use from irrigation to wildlife purposes. The farmers objected to these 
change applications claiming that they violated their “New Land Stored 
Water Rights” because the changes would decrease the amount of reservoir 
water available for irrigation. Engineer rejected Farmers’ arguments and 
granted NFWF’s application, finding that Farmers would not suffer any 
injury. Farmers appealed this finding to a Decree court, which rejected the 
findings of Engineer and found that the program would in fact injure the 
Farmers’ water rights. NFWF and Engineer appealed this finding. On 
appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Decree court failed 
to give dereference to the findings and conclusions of Engineer. Upon 
review of the case, the appellate court found that Engineer properly found 
that: (1) a transfer to the Foundation limited to the consumption portion 
would avoid conflict and injury to other existing water rights; (2) the 
findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Engineer applied 
the correct legal rule. Thus, the court held that there would be no injury to 
the Farmers’ rights. 
 
Mono Cty. v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 890 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 
County appealed the decision of the district court finding that a previously 
agreed to decree regulating a water basin did not allow for allocation of 
water from the basin to an area lake. On appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that the district court erred in dismissing County’s 
complaint. Therefore, the court set out to determine whether the decree 
could be amended to allow for allocation of water flow to the lake. The 
court felt that this would be determined based upon whether the public trust 
doctrine was applicable to previously set rights under the doctrine of prior 
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appropriation and permitted alteration of prior allocations. After review, the 
court determined that any decision they made would have a significant 
impact on Nevada water law, but based upon existing Nevada law, the court 
was unsure how the Nevada Supreme Court would itself resolve the matter. 
Therefore, the court held that it would need certification of the issue to the 
Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
D. New Mexico 
 
San Juan Citizens All. v.U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 16-cv-376-MCA-
JHR, 2018 WL 2994406 (D.N.M. June 14, 2018). 
 
Environmental Organization filed suit against Government Agencies over 
Government Agencies’ decision to lease several parcels of federal mineral 
estate on federal land, alleging violation of the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”). The district court found that: (1) Government 
Agencies failed to adequately consider—via a “hard look”—downstream 
greenhouse gas emissions from the leases, thus requiring remand of the case 
for a new cumulative impact analysis, and such analysis must be done with 
up-to-date scientific tools and analyses; (2) because such analyses must be 
revised, the court declined to examine them specifically; (3) because the 
evidence upon which Environmental Organization’s claim about air quality 
was based was incomplete, it could not be concluded that Government 
Agencies failed to take a “hard look” at the cumulative impacts to air 
quality from the leases; (4) Government Agencies failed to utilize the 
information in its possession regarding the impacts of the leases on water 
quantity, and thus, failed its duty to take a “hard look” at that environmental 
impact; (5) Government Agencies met their “hard look” duty regarding 
water quality; and (6) the requirement of revised impact analyses prevented 
the court from addressing the other issues raised by Environmental 
Organization. For those reasons, the court set aside both the leases and the 
finding of no significant impact and remanded the matter to Government 
Agencies for further analysis consistent with the court’s findings. 
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State  
 
Colorado 
 
Jim Hutton Educ. Found. v. Rein, 2018 CO 38M.  
 
Surface Water Owners (“Owners”) filed suit against State Engineer over 
concerns that permitted groundwater wells, which other individuals had 
begun installing in the groundwater basin under their surface water, had not 
been pumping designated groundwater, and thus, had been negatively 
affecting their senior surface water rights. A recent legislative amendment 
created a rule precluding any redrawn water basin boundaries from 
excluding any already existing wells, effectively precluding the redress 
sought by Owners, so Owners’ main argument was that the legislative 
amendment was unconstitutional. The case was filed in Water Court, which 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because State Commission 
had not yet determined whether the water in question was designated 
groundwater. Owners appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, which held 
as follows: (1) because the issue did not involve any disputed facts, it would 
review the question of subject matter jurisdiction de novo; (2) because state 
statutory framework dictates that State Commission has jurisdiction over 
claims involving designated groundwater, and Water Court has those 
involving non-designated ground water, Water Court’s decision was legally 
sound; and (3) the unique constitutional nature of Owners’ claims did not 
do enough to overcome their burden of proving that the Water Court should 
have jurisdiction. For those reasons, the Court affirmed the Water Court’s 
dismissal of the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
 
Michigan 
 
Gottleber v. Cty. of Saginaw, No. 336011, 2018 WL 2944211 (Mich. Ct. 
App. June 12, 2018). 
 
Property Owners filed suit against County after County ceased pumping 
water from the property due to its decision to use abutting property for a 
Dredged Material Disposal Facility (“DMDF”) and Wetland Mitigation 
Area (“WMA”), and Property Owners’ property subsequently flooded. The 
trial court found that the DMDF was a federal project, and thus, County had 
no liability at all for the flooding caused by that project. The trial court also 
found that the cessation of pumping from the WMA did not constitute an 
affirmative act necessary to make County liable. Property Owners appealed, 
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and the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that: (1) the record showed that 
County was involved with the DMDF from the beginning and still owned 
the property on which it was housed, thus making it a proper party to 
Property Owners’ claims regarding it; (2) County’s removal of pumps from 
the WMA site constituted an affirmative action, which was enough to 
constitute liability; (3) Property Owners offered sufficient evidence to clear 
the summary dismissal threshold regarding why they believed County’s 
actions caused the flooding of the property; and (4) County’s argument that 
it was immune from liability because it was acting in accordance with the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers was inconsistent with existing 
authority. For those reasons, the court reversed the trial court’s order for 
summary disposition in favor of County and remanded the issue for further 
proceedings consistent with its holdings. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
New Hampshire 
 
In re Cook, No. 2017–0142, 2018 WL 2074773 (N.H. May 4, 2018). 
 
Property Owner filed an appeal seeking review of Wetlands Council’s 
decision to uphold Government Agency’s denial of Property Owner’s 
permit request to extend his dock onto a local river. The Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire held that because the key question in this case was whether 
Property Owner could adequately establish a justification for his dock 
extension based on a “need,” and the term “need” was undefined by the 
state legislature, the term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 
Because Government Agency did not have the court’s guidance in making 
its initial interpretation of the statute and ruling on Property Owner’s permit 
application, the Court vacated the decision and remanded it to Government 
Agency for further review consistent with those findings. The Court further 
held that Property Owner’s ability to use an existing dock with “all-tide 
access” located on an abutting property was irrelevant to the question of 
whether Property Owner had shown “need” in this particular instance. For 
those reasons, the question was reversed and remanded for further 
consideration. 
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New Jersey 
 
Oaks Dev. Corp. v. Planning Bd. Of Twp. of Old Bridge, No. A-2666-16T2, 
2018 WL 1996966 (N.J. Apr. 30, 2018). 
 
Development Company appealed a decision affirming City Government’s 
determination to deny Development Company’s application to connect its 
project with City Government’s system without a one-million-gallon water 
storage tank. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that City 
Government’s decision was entitled to a presumption of validity, and that 
presumption, combined with the evidence in the record supporting 
Government Agency’s determination that the development would require 
additional water storage capacity, was sufficient to justify the affirmation of 
City Government’s decision. Because Development Company failed to 
introduce evidence that would overcome its significant burden to rebut 
Government Agency’s presumption of validity, the Court affirmed City 
Government’s decision to deny Development Company’s application.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
South Carolina 
 
Jowers v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, No. 2016-000428, 2018 
WL 2449220 (S.C. May 30, 2018). 
 
Landowners of property along rivers and streams in South Carolina 
(“Landowners”) brought suit against South Carolina Department of Health 
and Environmental Control (“DHEC”) challenging the registration 
provisions in the Surface Water Withdrawal Act (“Act”). This provision of 
the Act allows persons to make surface water withdrawals without a permit 
if done for agricultural purposes. Landowners challenged this provision 
claiming that the provision constituted (1) an unconstitutional taking of 
private property for private use and was a violation of their due process 
rights by depriving them of their property without notice or an opportunity 
to be heard; and (2) a violation of the public trust doctrine that forbids the 
disposal of assets held by the State in trust. The district court granted 
DHEC’s motion for summary judgment after finding that Landowners did 
not have standing. The court also found that there was no unconstitutional 
taking of private property because landowners were not deprived of any 
rights, and subsequently, there was also no violation of due process. 
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Additionally, the court found that the public trust doctrine was not violated 
because Landowners never lost their right to use the surface water, and 
there were no injuries as a result of the withdrawals. Landowners appealed.  
On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the lower court 
finding that there was no unconstitutional taking of private party because 
Landowners failed to show the taking of the property was unreasonable, 
and regarding the public trust claims, the court found Landowners failed to 
show that any public trust asset had been lost as a result of agricultural 
users withdrawing surface water, and any claims of future harms were not 
justiciable. 
 
Duncan v. Drasites, No. 2016–000046, 2018 WL 2230560 (S.C. Ct. App. 
May 16, 2018). 
 
Property Owner appealed the ruling of Master-in-Equity that Easement 
Holder had an easement on Property Owner’s property. Master-in-Equity 
found that: (1) the easement was created to allow the dominant estate access 
to the lake, therefore burdening the entire property line; and (2) that 
Easement Holder had the right to launch small watercraft into the lake from 
the easement. The Court of Appeals of South Carolina held that Master-in-
Equity did not err in either determination because: (1) the intent of the 
grantor could not have been to give Easement Holder an easement that 
ended just short of the lake (or just at the lake if the water was high); (2) all 
plats in both parties’ chains of title evidenced an easement ending at the 
water’s edge; and (3) the ability to launch small watercraft from the 
easement was “incident to the enjoyment” of said easement, and therefore 
was not a burden on the property. For those reasons, the court affirmed 
Master-in-Equity’s decision. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS 
 
Federal  
 
8th Cir.  
 
Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of Lake Traverse Reservation v. U.S. Corps of 
Eng’rs, 888 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. Apr. 25, 2018).  
 
Tribe claimed that U.S. Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) was not adhering to 
proper administrative procedure and had erroneously allowed Landowner to 
construct a road under the pretext of agricultural use when, rather, it was for 
Landowner’s own private development. Tribe alleged violations of federal 
laws by Corps for its failure to preserve the lake. Tribe appealed the lower 
court’s decision to dismiss the majority of its claims. On appeal, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that Tribe’s prior notice to Landowner, 
that the authorization was subject to recapture, and any subsequent efforts 
to enforce were subject to Corps’ discretion and, thus, were essentially 
nonjusticiable.  The court also affirmed the lower court’s determination that 
Corps’ communications regarding the exemption determinations and permit 
issuance were not final agency action, even though this did little to assist 
the Tribe with its statute of limitations defense. The court also held that the 
permits issued to Landowner were not “inappropriately stacked” or 
interrelated as Tribe claimed but were instead separate and independent 
projects.   
 
M.D. Louisiana 
 
United States v. 9.345 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Iberville 
Parish, State of Louisiana, No. 11-00803-JWD-EWD, 2018 WL 1920169 
(M.D. La. Apr. 24, 2018).  
 
This case involved a federal eminent domain action to acquire and protect a 
cavernous natural resource reserve from Company. The court reviewed 
opposing motions in limine to exclude evidence and affirmed the 
Government’s motion to exclude “scope of the project” evidence because 
no change in market value was actually shown due to the condemnation. In 
their separate motions, Government requested to exclude Company’s 
“condemnation blight” evidence, or evidence showing adverse impacts of 
the condemnation, while Company requested to exclude Government’s 
evidence of Company’s lack of action in marketing the property and the 
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efficiency of conversion of the cavern’s use for the Government’s intended 
purpose. The district court held that since this taking was a federal eminent 
domain proceeding and was de jure, a taking for public interest based in 
law rather than on fact, evaluating the “condemnation blight” evidence was 
not appropriate. Likewise, the “scope of the project” evidence to show 
negative impact on market value was found to be inappropriate in this case, 
because there was no dispute or evidence showing that the market value of 
the property was negatively impacted. Although Government’s motion was 
partially denied, the court provided an allowance for Company to present 
additional evidence in the future that the eminent domain status, and 
advertisement of this status, prevented them from further developing and 
capitalizing on the maximum market value of the property prior to the 
actual taking. 
 
D. Maine 
 
Coastal Me. Botanical Gardens v. Town of Boothbay, Maine, No. 2:17-cv-
00493-JDL, 2018 WL 1915923 (D. Me. Apr. 23, 2018).  
 
This case involved Developer’s claims alleging violation of procedural due 
process. Developer had a development permit in place, but the permit was 
rescinded after objections from other residents. Intervenors, who owned 
neighboring property, appealed the grant of the development permit. The 
town’s Board of Appeals (“Board”) reviewed, conducted an investigation, 
and visited the property and development site. However, Developer alleged 
this to be improper ex parte communication. Developer requested that the 
Board members who visited the property independently recuse themselves 
from the subsequent review and determination process. The decision 
ultimately came down to those votes, and Developer’s permit was rescinded 
because Developer’s proposed plans were not found to be appropriate for 
the proposed site of the development, which is in a watershed overlay. An 
agreement and settlement for a consent decree was reached, but Intervenors 
objected to the decree, claiming that the decree would prevent them from 
continuing to fight Developer’s proposed plans. After judicial review, the 
court granted the motion for entry of the consent decree. The court found 
that the consent decree was valid for various reasons, most notably the 
efficiency for facilitating an agreement between the parties, and noted that 
Intervenors were not barred by the consent decree to further pursue their 
objections through judicial review.  
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E.D. Washington 
 
Little Butte Prop. Owners Water Ass’n v. Bradley, No. 2:17-CV-162-RMP, 
2018 WL 1975682 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 2018).  
 
Landowner had grandfathered water rights but objected and restricted 
Association from accessing his property to facilitate access to water, despite 
an existing easement for that purpose. The district court granted County’s 
motion to dismiss constitutional claims, granted Association’s motion to 
dismiss Landowner’s counterclaims, and granted Association’s motion to 
exclude Landowner’s witness testimony, but denied Landowner’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction. The court determined that additional 
constitutional violation claims, civil rights claims against County and 
Association stemming from the other claims, were dismissed along with the 
court’s grant of County’s motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion 
to dismiss the injunctive relief claim because no urgency or requested relief 
was reflected in the pleadings. Landowner was not ultimately asking for the 
type of injunctive relief he requested initially. The court sanctioned 
Landowner by not allowing Landowner’s witnesses, and the court 
determined that the witnesses were not reliable, since Landowner did not 
provide enough evidence to deem them reliable and failed to provide timely 
notice of their intent to provide information and their qualifications.  
 
State  
 
Florida 
 
Blok Builders, LLC v. Katryniok, No. 4D16-1811, 2018 WL 1940951 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018).  
 
Landowner sued Company and Contractors for negligence that resulted in 
damages and injury caused to Landowner’s property, specifically the 
collapse of Landowner’s driveway, due to Company and Contractor’s 
manipulation of the subsurface utility lines. Subcontractors appealed the 
lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment motions brought 
regarding crossclaims. The lower court held that even though there was an 
indemnification provision within the agreement itself, the subcontract was 
not subject to the indemnification statute relied upon for the claim. Since it 
was excavation of subsurface utilities, rather than construction of an actual 
structure, the court held that Subcontractor’s work did not constitute the 
type of construction covered by the statute. The court relied on the statute’s 
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plain language to find that the contract was not covered by the 
indemnification statutes. Accordingly, the District Court of Appeal of 
Florida reversed the lower court’s finding, holding instead that 
Subcontractor was not legally obligated to indemnify the initial contracting 
party, but affirmed the lower court’s finding that Subcontractor was 
obligated to indemnify the direct Contractor, with whom it had a 
contractual relationship.  
 
Kansas 
 
NPIF2 Kan. Ave., LLC v. BH Invs., LLC, 416 P.3d 1044 (Kan. Ct. App. 
Apr. 27, 2018).  
 
Landowner I appealed the lower court’s decision granting Landowner II an 
irrevocable license to be established between the two landowners of 
adjacent and abutting property. Because the two parties could not establish 
an independent and voluntary agreement that would facilitate a mutual use, 
the court enforced a license allowing such use for both parties. The granting 
of the license was based essentially on “equitable relief” because the license 
was mutually beneficial to both parties to the extent that it was necessary 
for each “to achieve the best use of their respective property.” Although the 
Court of Appeals of Kansas here affirmed the lower court’s establishment 
of the license between the two properties, the court also held that no notice 
was provided for the imposition of an injunction that would prevent the 
license’s revocation without the sale of one of the properties. Therefore, 
because such notice to the parties is required, the court reversed the lower 
court’s granting of the injunction.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Kentucky 
 
Big Sandy Co., L.P. v. EQT Gathering, LLC, 545 S.W.3d 842 (Ky. Apr. 26, 
2018).  
 
A pipeline easement agreement between Pipeline Owner and Estate Owner 
required that if Estate Owner planned to mine in the easement area stated in 
the agreement, Pipeline Owner would be required to move the pipeline, 
paying all costs to do so, or purchase the mineral rights at depths below the 
pipeline from Estate Owner. This situation occurred, but because the 
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specific tracts that Estate Owner planned to mine housed pipeline 
infrastructure that was already existing in those locations prior to the 
development of the pipeline easement agreement, Pipeline Owner disputed 
that the easement agreement applied to those specific tracts. Estate Owner 
requested review of appellate court’s reversal of circuit court’s finding that 
the easement agreement in place between Estate Owner and Pipeline Owner 
applied to the specific tracts under dispute. The Supreme Court of Kentucky 
essentially reversed the reversal, siding with Estate Owner due to the 
unambiguous nature of the contract and its lack of differentiation between 
existing and future pipeline installations and its clear reference to the 
authority held by Estate Owner to use the surface to develop minerals, even 
though Estate Owner only held mineral rights on the specific tracts. The 
Court further held that the agreement did ultimately apply to those tracts 
and Pipeline Owner was bound to the pipeline relocation or mineral 
purchase requirements of the agreement regarding those specific tracts.  
 
Michigan 
 
Savoy Energy LP v. Beasinger, No. 336392, 2018 WL 2166044 (Mich. Ct. 
App. May 10, 2018). 
 
Servient Estate Owner (“Servient”) brought this action against Dominant 
Estate Owner (Dominant”), alleging Dominant was overburdening the 
easement. Dominant owned a piece of land that was landlocked. Dominant 
obtained an easement against Servient from the previous landowner. The 
easement was for the ingress and egress from the property as well as public 
utilities. However, at the end of the conveyance of the land, it also made 
reference to oil and gas interests. Dominant decided to drill for oil and used 
heavy machinery that was transported on the easement. Servient claimed 
that Dominant unduly burdened the easement tract of land and damaged the 
land itself. The lower court determined that Dominant could use the 
easement going forward but only for emergency purposes because 
Dominant unduly burdened and damaged the easement tract of land. The 
Court of Appeals of Michigan determined that Dominant could use the 
easement with heavy machinery because previous owners used heavy 
machinery on the easement land. Additionally, the appellate court 
determined that Dominant did overburden and damage the easement but 
concluded that the lower court’s determination was too extreme. The 
appellate court remanded the case in order for the lower court to determine 
a remedy that was more equitable to both parties.  
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This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
New Jersey 
 
Larue v. Monmouth Cty. Agric. Dev. Bd., No. A–2608–16T1, 2018 WL 
1790073 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 16, 2018). 
 
Farm Owners appealed Development Board’s decision that farm was not 
entitled to protection under the Right to Farm Act (“RTFA”). State 
Agricultural Development Committee (“Committee”) overturned 
Development Board’s decision, and the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division, affirmed. The court held that the original deciding body 
applied a stricter test than is required by New Jersey authority, which 
simply calls for “’a legitimate, agriculturally-based reason’ for the 
agricultural management practice at issue.” The court held that 
Committee’s decision to overturn that finding based on the application of 
the correct standard was proper, and accordingly affirmed the reversal in 
favor of Farm Owners. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Condemnation of Permanent & Temp. Rights of Way for Transp. of Nat. 
Gas in Buffalo v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., No. 1093 C.D. 2017, 2018 
WL 2945112 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 13, 2018). 
 
Pipeline Operator requested an easement from Landowner for the 
construction of a natural gas pipeline across its land. Landowner refused, 
and an eminent domain case was filed. Landowner challenged the amount 
of compensation that was awarded for the easement by the jury. 
Landowner’s expert testimony from land appraisers was excluded, and 
some of Pipeline Operator’s expert testimony was allowed by the lower 
court. Landowners challenged the exclusion of their expert’s testimony as 
to the value of the land and the subsequent compensation awarded by the 
jury. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania found that the 
trial court did not err by allowing the introduction of Pipeline Operator’s 
expert testimony. In addition, the court found that the trial court 
appropriately excluded Landowner’s expert testimony because the Pipeline 
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Operator’s testimony took into account the land value before and after the 
pipeline easement.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Texas 
 
Tabrizi v. City of Austin, No. 08-16-00209-CV, 2018 WL 1940556 (Tex. 
App. Apr. 25, 2018).  
 
Landowners appealed lower court’s decision to dismiss their claims against 
City and Employees. City denied Landowners from developing their 
property because of environmental issues with the development site, 
preventing both issuance of building permits and approval of an application 
for subdivision platting. Landowners’ request for an exemption from 
relevant requirements was denied. Landowners then brought a lawsuit 
claiming ultra vires, that City and Employees inappropriately and 
erroneously applied City’s land use regulations to their property and 
exceeded the scope of their duty. The lower court found that it lacked 
jurisdiction to evaluate City’s application of its ordinances. Landowners 
objected to this and requested additional review.  Upon this review, the 
Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the district court’s decision, evaluating 
the statutory authority vested in the municipal officials and holding that 
neither City nor Employees exceeded their authority in imposing 
restrictions and regulations on land use. City and Employees sought 
immunity due to their activities, the application and enforcement of land 
use ordinances, their governmental functions, and their actions being within 
their official authority as municipal representatives. The court maintained 
that there was no jurisdiction to construe municipal ordinances, even 
though Landowners claimed there was because they were seeking no 
monetary relief.  
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS 
 
Traditional Generation 
 
Maryland 
 
Montgomery Cty. v. GenOn Mid-Atlantic, LLC, No. 2626, Sept. Term, 
2016, 2018 WL 1920116 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 24, 2018).  
 
Power Plant filed suit to prevent County from issuing back-taxes based on 
its new interpretation of a state statute authorizing a tax on “station power,” 
or such power generated by Power Plant specifically used to power its 
operations. A Tax Court found in favor of Power Plant, and County filed 
for judicial review. The lower court upheld the ruling of the Tax Court, and 
County appealed. Because the statute requires that taxes be levied upon 
“delivery for final consumption in the County,” and Power Plant could not 
deliver generated power to itself, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
declined to hold that the lower court’s finding was erroneous. For that 
reason, the court affirmed the lower court’s finding in favor of Power Plant.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
New Hampshire 
 
In re Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC, No. 2017–0007, 2018 WL 
2307061 (N.H. May 22, 2018). 
 
Electric Company and Owner/Operator filed for review of an opinion 
issued by Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”), dismissing Electric 
Company’s petition to have a proposed contract for natural gas 
transportation and storage in order to be used by electric generation 
facilities approved and for associated details surrounding that approval. The 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed PUC’s decision. To make its 
determination, the Court looked to the intent of the state’s legislature in its 
recent restructuring of state law. The lower court found that allowing an 
Electric Company to purchase long-term gas capacity was contrary to the 
new statutes’ requirement that generation activities should be functionally 
separate from transmission and distribution activities. The Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire disagreed, holding that the “functional separation” 
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requirement was more permissive than PUC had read it and that it was to be 
read with the understanding that the primary goal of the restructured statute 
was “to reduce electricity costs to consumers.” For that reason, the Court 
reversed and remanded the issue to PUC for proceedings consistent with its 
opinion. 
 
Oklahoma 
 
In re Application of Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 2018 OK 31, 417 P.3d 1186. 
 
In 2014, Electricity Company sought approval from Corporation 
Commission on Electricity Company’s application for capital expenditure 
to install pollution-control devices at one of its power plants. When the 
application was denied by Corporation Commission, Electricity Company 
applied again in 2016 and was approved. Citizen Advocates sought review 
of Corporation Commission’s pre-approval of the installation of the 
scrubbers and the Oklahoma Supreme Court retained jurisdiction. Citizen 
Advocates claimed that res judicata precluded the second application and 
should accordingly should be invalidated. The Court disagreed, stating that 
Corporation Commission was exercising its legislative power, as opposed 
to its judicial power because it was considering the application based on 
future implications and making a new rule to be applied thereafter, not 
ruling on the legal propriety of the application, since it had already ruled 
against it in the first application. However, the Court did find that 
Corporation Commission lacked the authority to approve the application 
outside of the proper statute. Thus, the Court vacated the order of 
Corporation Commission, recommending that Electricity Company re-
apply under the correct statute. 
 
Wisconsin 
 
Town of Holland v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of Wis., 2018 WI App 38, No. 
2017AP1129, 2018 WL 2448579. 
 
Town sued Public Service Commission (“Commission”), arguing against 
Commission’s approval of the construction and operation of high voltage 
transmission line for electrical utilities. In its argument for judicial review, 
Town alleged that the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) conducted 
by Commission was insufficient. Commission argued that the construction 
and operation of the high voltage transmission line was necessary to allow 
for an adequate supply of electricity to an area near Town. Citing 
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Wisconsin state law, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin ruled against 
Town, finding that the transmission line construction could be construed by 
Commission as being for the “reasonable needs of the public.” Because the 
appellate court grants deference to Commission’s prior decisions under 
review, the court’s review of the EIS was based on the adequacy of rational 
basis, as the court affords weight deference to the reasonableness of 
Commission’s adequacy determination. Ultimately, the appellate court held 
that Commission had conformed to the standard set out by state law in 
providing a rational basis for the approval order in controversy. 
 
Renewable Generation  
 
N.D. California 
 
Tech. Credit Corp. v. N.J. Christian Acad., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 993 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 18, 2018). 
 
Company filed suit against Church and School for breach of contract after 
Company provided funding for a failed solar energy project. Church and 
School filed a Motion to Dismiss and, alternatively, Motions for Improper 
Venue due to a forum selection clause in the contract, and a Motion to 
Transfer. The breach of contract claim stemmed from a series of events 
leading to the failed solar energy project between Church and School and a 
third-party Energy Company. Company initiated this action to collect its 
alleged damages as a result of Church and School’s failures to pay back the 
cost of the failed project. The district court found that: (1) although much of 
the process surrounding the creation of the contract in question took place 
in New Jersey, enough significant conduct related to the suit at hand took 
place in the Northern District of California to qualify it as a proper venue 
for the action; (2) the forum selection clause in the contract requiring 
disputes to be handled in California was valid, and thus, there was no 
reason to transfer the suit out of California; and (3) no other factor, 
including the court’s familiarity with governing law, local interest in the 
suit, burden on the local judicial system, court congestion, parties’ choice of 
forum, or costs of resolving a dispute which is unrelated to the particular 
forum outweighed the validity of the forum selection clause and provided a 
reason to transfer the action out of California. For those reasons, the court 
denied Church and School’s motions to dismiss and to transfer the action to 
New Jersey.  
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
 
Bankruptcy 
 
5th Cir.  
In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 888 F.3d 122 (5th 
Cir. 2018). 
 
Service Providers appealed grant of Investor’s motion to dismiss Service 
Providers’ claims. After Corporation filed for bankruptcy, Service 
Providers, who had fostered Corporation’s operations, brought claims to 
enforce their existing liens and retain them as part of the bankruptcy estate, 
rather than allow them to be excluded as separate royalty interests conveyed 
to Investor, in response to Investor’s attempt to exclude the royalty 
interests. Conveyance of these royalty interests occurred after Service 
Providers’ liens were filed. Liens were attached to operating interest, and 
overriding royalty interests were conveyed to Investor. However, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that liens cannot attach to the royalty interest, 
since that interest was previously conveyed, even if the minerals had not yet 
been extracted. The court evaluated the statutory “safe-harbor provision,” 
specifically addressing whether that provision applied to the overriding 
royalty interests conveyed. By evaluating the statutory language, the court 
determined that the safe harbor provision applied because Service Providers 
did not give “actual notice,” or provide any evidence that they did so, of 
their outstanding liens at the time of purchase of the overriding royalty 
interests. Therefore, the liens cannot attach to the royalty interests and the 
lower court’s decision to grant Investor’s Motion to Dismiss was affirmed.  
 
Mergers & Acquisition 
 
D. Colorado 
 
United States v. Pioneer Nat. Res. Co., No. 17–cv–0168–WJM–NYW, 
2018 WL 1858549 (D. Colo. Apr. 18, 2018). 
 
Agency claimed that Company failed to take proper action to remediate 
problems with their mining operations, resulting in the release of 
contaminates into nearby water bodies. This action was brought to 
determine whether Company is liable for such illegal activity as successor 
of their predecessor company. CERCLA allows claims to be made against 
the entity that “at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
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operated any facility.” Even though in an asset sale, also included in 
Company’s history, such liabilities are not transferred to the buying party, 
such liability can be conveyed (1) if such liability is taken on “expressly or 
impliedly,” (2) if the buying party is essentially a successor or a 
“continuation” of the selling party, (3) if the companies are merged, or (4) 
if the sale is an attempt to relieve seller from liabilities. The district court 
disagreed with Company’s claims that it was not the owner or operator of 
the mining operation at the time of discharge. The court granted Agency’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the history of corporate 
mergers shows Company to be the successor and thus the liable party 
through indirect or successor liability, despite the lack of documentation 
showing that acceptance of liability was taken voluntarily or knowingly.  
 
Intellectual Property – Federal  
 
Supreme Court 
 
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.Ct. 
1365 (2018). 
 
Patent Owner filed suit against Energy Company for infringement of a 
patent pertaining to technology used for protecting wellhead equipment 
utilized during hydraulic fracturing, petitioning both the Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) for inter partes review, and filing suit in district 
court. The district court ruled in favor of Energy Company, while PTO 
found in favor of Patent Owner. Patent Owner appealed, challenging the 
constitutionality of inter partes review for violating its right to a jury trial. 
The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the ruling of the district court. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court, addressing only the constitutionality of inter 
partes review, held that because inter partes review fell within the “public-
rights doctrine,” PTO has authorization to conduct such review without 
violating Article III of the constitution.  
 
E.D. Virginia 
 
Cooper v. Greenly Grp. for Solar Techs., Ltd., No. 1:17–cv–1313–LMB–
MSN, 2018 WL 1875291 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2018). 
 
Individual alleged that Third Party fraudulently transferred the patent rights 
in question to Energy Company after Individual filed an arbitration demand 
in order to resolve a dispute with Third Party. The arbitrator found against 
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Third Party for a large monetary amount, and Third Party fled the country 
to avoid collection efforts by Individual. The district court adopted the 
findings of a Magistrate Judge and entered a default judgment against 
Energy Company. 
 
Intellectual Property – State  
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Weiss v. Fritch, Inc., No. 2332 EDA 2017. 2018 WL 1940109 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 25, 2018). 
 
Landowner sued Oil Provider and Environmental Service for negligence 
because of damage done to Landowner’s oil tank and home. Landowner 
entered into a contract with Oil Provider to receive oil in his 275-gallon 
aboveground oil storage tank in the basement of his home. When the tank 
was installed, Oil Provider gave Landowner a pamphlet promoting 
Environmental Service’s “TankSure Program,” which would provide 
corrosion protection and annual tests for tank corrosion as well as warranty 
for a replacement tank. Landowner opted to enroll in the program, and oil 
deliveries and program activities began. However, in December 2014, Oil 
Provider refilled Landowner’s tank, causing it to rupture and spill 
approximately 100 gallons of oil in the basement. Oil Provider cleaned up 
the spill, removed the tank, and installed a new tank but did not use proper 
procedures and caused further damage to Landowner’s house. The trial 
court dismissed the negligence claims on the grounds that Landowner had 
not proven that the TankSure Program falsely advertised any benefits or 
qualities it did not possess. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
found that Landowner failed on a claim of breach of contract, which it then 
attempted to rebrand as a claim of false advertising, which, likewise, failed. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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Other Issues – Federal 
 
5th Cir.  
 
Entergy Texas, Inc. v. Nelson, 889 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 
Plaintiff Operating Company filed suit against Public Utility Commission 
of Texas (“Utility Commission”) on the grounds that Utility Commission’s 
previous order concerning the allocation of bandwidth payments conflicted 
with a prior Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) order. 
FERC regulates energy production and sale that takes place across state 
lines, and Operating Company performs as a public utility in multiple 
states. Thus, Operating Company falls under FERC’s jurisdiction. To 
ensure that Operating Company’s different state-based subsidiaries 
maintained approximately equal costs of production, FERC maintained a 
system of bandwidth payments that ensured that, on a yearly basis, “...if 
necessary, ‘payments [are] made by the low cost Operating Company(ies) 
to the high cost Operating Company(ies) such that, after reflecting the 
payments and receipts, no Operating Company [has] production costs more 
than 11 percent above the Entergy System average or more than 11 percent 
below the Entergy System average.’” However, the issue presents itself at 
state borders because state regulators determine what effect bandwidth 
payments have on retail rates for customers. In 2007, this became an issue 
for Texas and Louisiana regulators as they had, in 2006, a shared subsidiary 
under Operating Company. The respective regulators of the two states had 
differing opinions concerning the proper split of their $120.1 million 
bandwidth payment, resulting in Operating Company owing more to the 
two state legislatures than it had received the previous year. Naturally, 
Operating Company argued this to be unfair and took its complaint to 
FERC which dismissed the matter multiple times until Operating Company 
filed suit in district court where the court found in Operating Company’s 
favor, enjoining enforcement of Utility Commission’s order for payment. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that FERC was correct in 
dismissing the matter and that Utility Commission’s order was not 
preempted by FERC’s order.  
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9th Cir.  
 
Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC, 888 
F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 
After conveyance of property through a tax sale, the court considered 
whether Purchaser was responsible for CERCLA-imposed penalties for 
activity that occurred during Previous Owner’s operation. A site 
remediation plan was developed but was not carried out prior to Previous 
Owner’s failure to pay taxes and the subsequent tax foreclosure sale. After 
the tax sale, Department implemented the plan and took action to clean up 
the site, but sought reimbursement of the associated costs from Purchaser, 
who then claimed that its interest was as a third-party to the contamination, 
without a “contractual relationship” with the party initially responsible for 
the contamination and thus was not obligated to take on the costs of 
remediation. Generally, this was a defense offered by CERCLA that allows 
a party to avoid liability as an uninterested third party to a violation. The 
lower court agreed with Purchaser, and Department appealed. On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, 
holding that Purchaser was responsible and still liable for the costs, and the 
relationship between the parties could not fall under the “third party 
defense.” This was because the tax sale transaction did constitute a 
contractual relationship between the parties, and Purchaser was not an 
“innocent” party or purchaser with no knowledge of the property’s history 
of contamination, and all acts causing the contamination occurred on the 
property itself and were caused by the Previous Owner. Therefore, the court 
reversed and remanded the lower court’s decision.  
 
N.D. West Virginia 
 
Corder v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:18CV30, 2018 WL 2925128 (N.D.W. 
Va. June 11, 2018). 
 
Oil and gas royalty owners (“Royalty Owners”) brought suit against 
Producer for breach of contract and improper reduction of their payments. 
Royalty Owners alleged that Producer had made improper reductions of 
their royalty payments, overcharged them for deductions, and failed to pay 
them for the volume of natural gas they had extracted and sold. Producer 
filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the royalty agreements between the 
parties allowed them to make necessary deductions of payments. The 
district court dismissed these claims on the grounds that clauses in contract 
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allow for it. However, the court dismissed all claims but one for breach of 
contract. The court found that in the case of a single breach of contract 
claim, there was an express prohibition of reduction of costs in order to 
market the oil. The court denied the motion to dismiss the claim that 
Producer improperly reduced the cost it at which it was selling oil in order 
to market it. Royalty Owners’ suit was kept alive by this claim and the 
court allowed it to proceed. 
 
Other Issues – State 
 
Texas 
 
Bosque Disposal Sys., LLC v. Parker Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 17–0146, 
2018 WL 2372810 (Tex. May 25, 2018). 
 
Taxpayers alleged that they were subject to illegal double taxation by 
County after the land they owned was taxed as well as the saltwater 
disposal wells that laid beneath the land. The trial court found that this did 
amount to illegal taxation. However, upon appeal, the appellate court found 
for County. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas held that under the 
Texas Tax Code, the separate taxation by County of the property’s surface 
and the property’s subsurface saltwater disposal wells was completely 
proper. The court noted that although the land and improvements are 
typically taxed as one, per the Tax Code, County is permitted to separate 
them and tax individually. Additionally, the court rejected Taxpayer’s claim 
that the saltwater disposal wells were not taxable because they were 
intangible personal property in addition to a claim that County was taxing 
Taxpayers business interest in the disposal wells.  
 
Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. Shale Expl., LLC, No. 01–15–00888–CV, 2018 WL 
1870081 (Tex. App. Apr. 19, 2018).  
 
Oil and Gas Company (“O&G Company”) appealed a jury award to 
Exploration Company regarding “misappropriation of trade secrets.” O&G 
Company claimed that Exploration Company’s claim was subject to claim 
preclusion, and thus barred, and lacked sufficient evidence to show O&G 
Company’s liability regarding the alleged misappropriation. The Court of 
Appeals of Texas affirmed the lower court’s finding that Exploration 
Company’s claim was not barred by claim preclusion because no privity 
existed between Exploration Company and other related companies that 
were involved in earlier, similar actions. The court also found that the 
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“economic loss rule” did not bar the claim because the claim is not required 
to be a contract claim but could be a separate misappropriation claim. 
Additionally, the court held that adequate evidence was presented to show 
that the subject of the dispute was in fact a trade secret and that O&G 
Company did actually misuse such information, due in part to the presence 
of confidentiality requirements and the history of communication provided 
by O&G Company. The court did, however, reverse the lower court’s 
support of the jury’s finding that such misappropriation was shown to be a 
result of malice, supported by adequate evidence. Therefore, the court also 
held that Exploration Company could not receive exemplary damages, due 
to the lack of malice.   
 
Lona Hills Ranch, LLC v. Creative Oil & Gas Operating, LLC, No. 03-17-
00743-CV, 2018 WL 1868054 (Tex. App. Apr. 19, 2018).  
 
Lessee and Operator sued Lessor for a breach of contract claim as counter 
to Lessor’s trespass claim regarding an oil and gas lease. Lessor appealed 
the lower court’s interlocutory decision to deny Lessor’s motion to dismiss 
Operator’s and Lessee’s counterclaims after Lessor’s initial trespass claims. 
The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed in part the lower court’s denial of 
Operator’s motion to dismiss and denied in part, dismissing all of 
Operator’s breach of contract counterclaims and a counterclaim for breach 
of contract brought by Lessee pertaining to the lease’s validity. The court 
held that the breach of contract counterclaim was not supported by adequate 
evidence “regarding Lessor’s alleged communications with third parties,” 
but also that Lessor successfully showed that the elements of the 
counterclaims were “predicated factually on lessor's exercise of right of free 
speech” and on “lessor’s right to petition.” This was based on Operator’s 
and Lessee’s reference to multiple statements and filing of a court action by 
Lessor. Further, no evidence was provided that such statements were 
restricted by the lease contract.  
 
Ramsland v. WFW Family, LP, No. 05-17-00326, 2018 WL 1790080 (Tex. 
App. Apr. 16, 2018). 
 
After members of both parties inherited various royalty and working 
interests on a particular lease, Family LP filed suit against Energy 
Company, alleging improper payments made by the operator of the wells to 
Energy Company. Energy Company filed countersuits alleging breach of 
contract and failure to make payments on working interest revenues 
received. Family LP filed for summary judgment on the counterclaims, 
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and—after an arduous procedural battle and the resolution of a related 
suit—eventually nonsuited its original claims against Energy Company. 
The trial court ultimately granted Family LP’s motion for summary 
judgment on Energy Company’s counterclaims, and Energy Company filed 
this appeal. The Texas Court of Appeals held that: (1) because Texas law 
does not rescue counterclaims in suits for declaratory judgment if barred, as 
a matter of law, by limitations, Energy Company’s motion for summary 
judgment on that basis was denied; (2) the record reflected no evidence of a 
breach of contract within four years of the filing of the suit at hand, nor any 
evidence of a violation of the Joint Operating Agreement in the same time 
frame; and (3) Energy Company could not receive equitable relief in the 
form of the working interest revenue because Energy Company did no work 
“for” Family LP in the relevant time period. For those reasons the court 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment against Energy Company on all issues 
before it and denied Energy Company recovery of Attorney’s Fees. 
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
D.C. Cir. 
 
Nat’l. Envtl. Dev. Ass’n's Clean Air Project v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 891 
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 
Environmental Advocates sued Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), 
seeking review of newly modified regulations of the Clean Air Act (“Act”). 
The regulations in controversy related to requirements that operators 
responsible for significant sources of pollution acquire a fixed-term permit. 
Environmental Advocates argued that EPA’s amendments established 
“inconsistent permit criteria” depending on the geographical location of the 
operator’s operation. According to Environmental Advocates, the 
regulatory amendments were inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a), which 
require EPA to implement the Act uniformly nationwide. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia held in favor of EPA regarding all 
arguments, determining that Environmental Advocate’s focus on the 
amendments surviving step one of Chevron was incorrect. The court noted 
that the federal statute in question solely addressed delegation-created 
inconsistencies instead of judicially created inconsistencies as well. In 
accordance with EPA’s position on the issue, the court also held that the 
Act allowed for inter-circuit non-acquiescence, as inter-circuit conflicts are 
inevitable regarding inconsistent judicial outcomes. Because of this ruling, 
federal courts’ ruling against EPA on local or regional issues does not 
consequently apply automatically across the nation. 
 
N.D. Alabama 
 
Day, LLC v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., No. 2:16–cv–00429–LSC, 2018 WL 
2572750 (N.D. Ala. June 4, 2018). 
 
Landowners brought suit against Pipeline Owner after a pipeline spill 
caused damage to Landowners’ property. Landowners brought claims of 
trespass, nuisance, wantonness, and negligence, as well as violations of the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (“RCRA”). Pipeline Owner moved for partial summary judgment on 
the plaintiffs’ environmental claims and argued that Landowners could not 
pursue a claim under the CWA because the spill occurred in 2014, was 
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imediately cleaned up, and the CWA only allows a citizen suit for ongoing 
violations. The district court agreed with Pipeline Owners and granted their 
motion for summary judgment. It found that the CWA claim could not 
stand because Pipeline Owners contained the spill and worked for years to 
remediate the effects of the spill. Additionally, the court found Landowners 
were unable to show that any remaining gasoline vapors presented an 
imminent risk to human health in violation of the RCRA, and as a result, it 
also granted Pipeline Owners’ motion for summary judgment on 
Landowner’s RCRA claim. 
 
E.D. California 
 
AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 1:15–CV–754–LJO–
BAM, 2018 WL 2734923 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2018). 
 
Water Conservation Agencies (“Agencies”) brought suit against U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation and other agencies (“Bureau”) challenging federal 
government’s 10-year water transfer program that moved water from sellers 
upstream of the Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta to buyers downstream of the 
delta. Agencies claimed that Bureau’s approval of different reports violated 
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the U.S. Endangered 
Species Act (“Species Act”). At trial, the district court found that all the 
reports challenged contained some unlawful parts within them, and the 
court ordered the parties to meet and come up with a proposed schedule for 
future proceedings. The parties could agree on whether the court should 
vacate he Bureau’s findings or remand without vacatur. Upon review of the 
facts, the court determined that, given the assertions of the parties, remand 
without vacatur was not justified. Because the court found that the facts 
suggested no environmental or other consequences would result from a 
vacatur of the reports, it ordered a vacatur of the reports of the Bureau. 
 
N.D. California 
 
Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, No. 16-cv-
07014-VC, 2018 WL 2210680 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2018). 
 
The City of Oakland (“City”) entered into an agreement with Developer to 
build and operate a bulk cargo shipping terminal. Terms of the agreement 
stipulated that any regulations adopted by City after the agreement was 
entered into would not apply to the subject of the agreement: the shipping 
terminal. However, an exception to this stipulation existed. If City 
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determined that failure to apply a new regulation would pose a substantial 
danger to the health or safety to the people of the city, then the regulation 
could apply to the terminal. After the agreement was signed, concerns 
throughout the city grew regarding the potential transport of coal through 
the terminal. In response, the City Council adopted new regulations banning 
coal operations at bulk material facilities, and the new regulation 
specifically noted that it applied to the shipping terminal in question. 
Developer brought suit against City claiming that City lacked substantial 
evidence to conclude that the potential coal operations at the terminal 
would pose a substantial health or safety risk to the people of the city, and 
thus it was in breach of the agreement. The district court found that while 
the substantial evidence standard created by the agreement was highly 
deferential to lawmakers, it found that City erred in allowing the new 
regulation to apply to the terminal because there was insufficient evidence 
before the council made its decision showing the potential coal operations 
would pose a substantial health or safety risk. Thus, the court found that the 
regulation adopted by City was a breach of the agreement between City and 
Developer, and accordingly, City could not restrict Developers coal 
operations. 
 
D. Colorado 
 
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 17–cv–3141–
WJM–STV, 2018 WL 1905145 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2018). 
 
Environmental Organization brought suit against Government Agency, 
alleging that Government Agency made an illegal decision not to perform a 
certain type of analysis under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in auctioning 
particular oil and gas leases. Government Agency found no need to perform 
the analysis because (1) its action of leasing would not “directly” cause any 
emissions which must fit within the particular standard; and (2) it argued 
that future emissions by leaseholders were not reasonably foreseeable. The 
district court determined that future emissions would be reasonably 
foreseeable if their location was known and they could be quantified and 
described and documented by Government Agency using the information in 
its possession. The court then laid out what it thought was the best 
argument in favor of Environmental Organization but disregarded it 
because it was not the one Environmental Organization pursued. The court 
found that the burden was on Environmental Organization to prove that 
Government Agency “arbitrarily or capriciously” made the decision that the 
information in its possession at the time was insufficient to make future 
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emissions reasonably foreseeable. Because its arguments did not overcome 
the presumption of validity in Government Agency’s favor, the court 
affirmed Government Agency’s determination and terminated the case. 
 
D. District of Columbia 
  
Clean Water Action v. Pruitt, No. 17–0817, 2018 WL 1865919 (D.D.C. 
Apr. 18, 2018). 
 
Environmental groups (“Groups”) brought suit against Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) challenging the agency’s postponement of a 
rule that limited how much toxic metal could be discharged along with the 
waste that water power plants create. Groups alleged that EPA failed to 
make the appropriate findings in order to have justification to stay the new 
rule. At trial, EPA moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that Groups’ 
claims were moot because the stay on the rule was already withdrawn. 
Instead, EPA issued an amendment to the rule and pushed back compliance 
dates. The trial court granted EPA’s motion to dismiss. Groups then 
motioned the court to allow them to amend their complaint to include 
claims challenging the amendment to the rule rather than the stay of the 
rule, but the court also denied this request. 
 
S.D. Florida 
 
Cotromano v. United Techs. Corp., No. 10-80840-Civ-Marra, 2018 WL 
2047468 (S.D. Fla. May 2, 2018). 
 
Private homeowners (“Homeowners”) brought suit against a rocket and 
aerospace testing and manufacturing plant (“Plant”) alleging contamination 
of the air, water, and soil of their properties. Homeowners made claims of 
contamination or risk of future contamination, loss of use and enjoyment of 
property, as well as diminution in value of property. Homeowners filed a 
putative class action suit alleging the class suffered over $1 billion in 
damages.  Landowners motioned to certify its class to the trial court. The 
trial court denied Homeowners’ bid to certify the class, finding that the 
proposed class area in the residential community was over-inclusive. The 
trial court relied on the findings of Homeowners’ experts, all of whom 
failed to connect the boundaries of the proposed class to the area at risk of 
contamination. Additionally, the court found that Homeowners’ claims 
were too individualized to justify a class action. Accordingly, the motion to 
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certify the class was denied, and the court ordered the case to proceed on 
behalf of individually named Homeowners. 
 
N.D. Illinois 
 
LCCS Grp. v. Lenz Oil Serv. Peoria, Inc., No. 16 C 5827, 2018 WL 
1961133 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2018). 
 
Facility Owner filed suit against Operator under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(“CERCLA”), alleging a release of hazardous substances from Facility 
Owner’s facility. Facility Owner’s records showed that Operator’s 
predecessor disposed of approximately 133,200 gallons of waste from the 
facility prior to Operator’s formation as an entity. Operator filed for 
summary judgment, arguing that it was not the same entity as its 
predecessor and had no relation to the activities causing the legal matter at 
hand, and thus, it could not be held responsible under CERCLA. However, 
the court agreed with Facility Owner that there was sufficient evidence to 
raise a question as to whether Operator was the legal successor in the matter 
of the disposal of the waste and denied Operator’s motion for summary 
judgment. 
 
E.D. North Carolina 
 
Save Our Sound OBX, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., No. 2:17–CV–4–FL, 
2018 WL 2671207, (E.D.N.C. June 4, 2018). 
 
Non-profit opposition group (“Opposition”) brought suit against the North 
Carolina Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway 
Administration (“Agencies”) challenging their approval of a 2.8-mile-long 
"jug-handle bridge" (“Bridge”) over the Pamlico Sound. Opposition 
claimed Agencies approved the Bridge without fully considering 
environmental consequences under National Environmental Protection Act 
(“NEPA”), the feasible alternatives under the Department of Transportation 
Act (“DTA”), or impacts of the Bridge on historically significant property 
under the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”). Opposition argued 
that Agencies’ approval of the Bridge was predetermined as part of a 
settlement agreement in which Agencies agreed to sign off on the Bridge in 
exchange for conservation groups dropping a lawsuit challenging the 
construction of another bridge that is part of the reconstruction of the entire 
highway. The district court found for Agencies, finding that Agencies 
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complied with the NEPA and other federal laws when approving a bridge in 
the Outer Banks. The court rejected Opposition’s claims of a settlement 
agreement predetermining Agencies’ approval of the bridge. 
 
S.D. West Virginia 
 
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Fola Coal Co., LLC, No. 2:17-3013, 2018 WL 
1833215 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 17, 2018). 
 
Environmental groups (“Groups”) brought suit against Coal Company for 
violations of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act (collectively “Acts”). Groups alleged that 
Coal Company improperly discharged pollutants from its mines into nearby 
waters. Coal Company moved to have the claims dismissed on the grounds 
that Groups’ claims were barred because res judicata precluded them. Coal 
Company asserted that two previous suits brought against them challenging 
their discharges into nearby streams were the same allegations as the claims 
brought by Groups and were thus barred by res judicata. The claims in the 
previous suits against Coal Company challenged the discharge of selenium 
into nearby water. In the present case, Groups specifically challenged the 
discharge of ionic chemicals. Because of this, the court disagreed with Coal 
Company and instead found that the causes of action brought by Groups 
were different from the previous suits and had different transactional nuclei. 
As such, res judicata did not bar Groups’ claims. 
 
State 
 
California 
 
Save Adelaida v. Cty. of San Luis Obispo, 2d Civ. No. B279285, 2018 WL 
2439874 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2018). 
 
Olive Orchard Owner (“Owner”) applied to the County of San Luis Obispo 
(“County”) for a minor use permit to hold events on its property. Owner 
planned to construct a 300-square-foot agricultural building for olive oil 
and wine processing. After reviewing the permit request, County issued a 
mitigated negative declaration (“MND”) granting the permit. Neighbors 
argued an MND was not sufficient and that environmental impact report 
(“EIR”) was required. The trial court found that an EIR was in fact 
necessary in order to analyze the impact of the project on traffic, noise, 
water use, etc. However, the court also determined that an EIR was not 
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necessary to analyze the project’s use of wastewater or compliance with the 
county’s land use ordinance. Both parties appealed. On appeal the 
California Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision and held that 
an EIR was required to analyze wastewater after finding discrepancies in 
the MND and statements by Owner’s staff regarding the waste water. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
World Bus. Acad. v. Cal. State Lands Comm’n, No. B284300, 2018 WL 
2948667 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2018). 
 
Environmentalist challenged the decision of state lands commission 
(“Commission”) to extend a lease to Power Company for state owned 
submerged and tidal lands of the Pacific Ocean. The lease was used for the 
placement of water intake and discharge structures used in Power 
Company’s nuclear plant cooling systems. Prior to approval of the lease 
extension, Commission did not prepare an environmental impact report, as 
required by the California Environmental Quality Act (“Act”), as it 
considered the extension to be an exemption to the Act’s requirement as an 
“existing facilities” categorial exemption. Environmentalist claimed that the 
exception was not applicable in this instance, and if it by chance was, it was 
subject to the “unusual circumstances” exception to the exception.  At trial, 
the court rejected Environmentalist’s claims and found that Commission’s 
extension of the lease was proper. Environmentalist contended that the 
exception, with respect to power companies, only applied to structures that 
transmitted power, not to those that generated or provided power. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeal of California disagreed with Environmentalist 
and found that the exception had been properly applied. The court also 
addressed the alleged exception to the exception. However, the court again 
agreed with the lower court’s finding that Commission properly examined 
whether the unusual circumstances exception applied. The court analyzed 
various factors used to determine whether the lease extension would have a 
significant impact on the environment or the possibility of a significant 
impact. After reviewing Commission’s analysis of the lease extension, the 
court found that it was proper. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s 
ruling that the lease extension did not require an environmental impact 
report as normally required by the Act.  
 
  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss2/3
2018]        Recent Case Decisions 303 
  
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfield, No. 67 MAP 2016, 2018 WL 
2448803 (Pa. June 1, 2018). 
 
Company appealed after the lower court reversed Board’s denial of 
Company’s development of natural gas wells in a district zoned 
“Residential-Agricultural.” The ordinance at issue held that when a use is 
not specifically permitted or denied, a use is approved by the board only if 
“it is similar to and compatible with the other uses permitted in the zone” 
and “is in no way in conflict with the general purposes” of the ordinance. 
The lower court held that drilling operations are “similar to” the 
Residential-Agricultural purposes in the ordinance. On appeal, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that oil and gas drilling operations are 
not “similar to” the uses permitted in the ordinance. The court explained 
that Board was free to make amendments to the ordinance in order to allow 
for those types of activities, but the language of the statute, as written, did 
not permit those types of activities. 
 
Friends of Lackawanna v. Dunmore Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 656 
C.D. 20172018 WL 2089812 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 7, 2018). 
 
Company owned Landfill, and in 2014, Company submitted an application, 
which was later approved, with Zoning Board to modify its existing permit 
and expand its usage of the land for waste management purposes. County 
Advocate objected and appealed to Zoning Board, alleging that the landfill 
constituted a structure under the City Zoning Ordinance, and therefore, the 
proposed new height of the landfill would exceed a relevant local 
ordinance’s height restrictions. County Advocate was offered an 
opportunity to present testimony and evidence of its case at multiple board 
hearings thereafter, despite objection from Company. After multiple 
hearings filled with many testimonials, Zoning Board determined that 
County Advocate lacked standing to appeal Zoning Board’s decision and 
affirmed its original decision to approve the application. Zoning Board 
reasoned that County Advocate was not a landowner abutting the landfill, 
and thus, lacked a pecuniary interest in the matter. County Advocate 
appealed to the trial court, to which Keystone responded with a motion to 
dismiss. The trial court heard the matter anyway and determined that 
Zoning Board was correct in its determination that County Advocate failed 
to demonstrate a substantial interest in the landfill expansion. On appeal, 
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania determined that County 
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Advocate’s group of homeowners did have a substantial interest in the 
matter and that County Advocate’s position as namesake of the group of 
homeowners did not forego that interest.  
 
Washington 
 
State v. Montlake LLC, No. 77359–3–I, 2018 WL 2041518 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Apr. 30, 2018). 
 
State Department of Transportation (“DOT”) was instructed by legislature 
to build several “mega-Projects” within the state. One of the projects 
included the replacement of a floating bridge across Lake Washington. In 
order to complete this project, DOT needed to condemn three lots located in 
a commercial district near the Lake. DOT published an Environmental 
Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the project and then brought suit against 
Landowners of the three lots to condemn the properties. After a hearing, the 
trial court granted DOT’s public use and necessity claim for condemnation, 
as well as two related orders addressing environmental and administration 
issues. Landowners and Lessees appealed all three orders.  On appeal the 
Washington Court of Appeals found that the evidence substantially 
supported the trial court’s finding that DOT’s condemnation decision was 
not arbitrary and capricious and that substantial evidence supported the 
findings that condemnation of the properties was necessary to complete the 
project.  Additionally, the court rejected Landowners’ argument that the 
Secretary of DOT improperly redelegated his condemnation authority to 
Program Administrator, citing a lack of evidence to support such 
allegations. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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